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BE1WEENTHEDOMESTICANDTHEFOREIGN: 
CEN1ERING THE NATION'S EDGES 
LEGAL BORDERLANDS: LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN BORDERS. Mary 
L. Dudziak 1 and Leti Volpp/ eds. Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 2006. Pp. viii+ 421. $19.95 (paper). 
Linda Bosniak3 
"Every theory addresses some questions as its central 
questions, and thereby makes other questions perip-
heral. "4 
Contemporary American constitutional thought is largely 
inward-looking. Most U.S. constitutional law scholarship "as-
sumes the state," as Alex Aleinikoff recently noted,5 and this 
means, among other things, that constitutional discourse focuses 
on relations among already-presumed members in an already-
constituted national space. The subjects and location of constitu-
tionalism, the "we" and the "here," are presupposed and unpro-
blematized. 
The fact that they are reflects a longstanding habit of insular 
thinking in the field. Constitutional scholarship's unwavering focus 
has long been the national self. And as this approach is conven-
tionally practiced, there is not much world beyond this self. The 
American nation- with its myriad internal complexities and fasci-
nations-is cast as the world entire. 
I. Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Guirado Professor of Law. History and Political 
Science. University of Southern California Gould School of Law. 
2. Professor of Law, University of California School of Law- Boa It Hall. 
3. Professor of Law. Rutgers Law School-Camden. Thanks to Alex Aleinikoff 
for perceptive comments on a draft of this review. 
4. JOAN TRONTO. MORAL BOUNDARIES: A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN 
ETHIC OF CARE 13 (1'!'!4). 
5. T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF. SEMBLANCES OF SOVEREIGNTY: THE 
CONSTITUTION. THE STATE AND AMERICAN CiTIZENSHIP 4 (2002). 
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Although rarely acknowledged in explicit terms, this insular-
ity-this self-absorption-reflects a dominant tradition in Anglo-
American normative political thought. Rawls' theory of justice 
presupposed a conception of "a democratic society [that is] a com-
plete and closed social system. "6 In his early work, he aimed to 
develop principles for "the basic structure of society conceived 
for the time being as a closed system isolated from other socie-
ties. '' 7 Much constitutional scholarship in recent decades has 
treated the American nation as a kind of Rawlsian island. 
Yet Rawls himself later recognized that the insularity premise 
is ultimately implausable and limiting,8 and it appears American 
constitutional law scholarship is gradually coming to understand 
this as well. Today, the fields of comparative constitutionalism, 
foreign affairs and international law are growth areas-a trend 
that reflects increasing awareness that our constitutional com-
munity is one among many others rather than a universe unto 
itself. Some constitutional scholars are also beginning to place 
globalization of economic and social life on the intellectual 
agenda, recognizing the need to understand the national self as 
located in a broader transnational field. Getting beyond insular-
ity, no doubt, will take time. Not infrequently, the world beyond 
the national self elicits more lip service than analytic integration. 
Still, there is little doubt that the comparative, the international, 
the global, are pressing in. The constitutional community's loca-
tion in a broader world, and the fact of its imbrications with out-
side others, are increasingly shaping constitutional thought-as 
they must if it is to be of real theoretical and practical value in 
coming decades. 
On the other hand, the problem of perspectival insularity 
cannot be remedied simply by recognizing the nation's global sit-
uatedness and its relations with legal actors and regimes beyond 
our own. It is not enough, that is, to supplement inward-looking 
constitutionalism by ensuring more air time for outward-
oriented approaches- by adding more courses and conferences 
and SSRN websites on the global and diplomatic and compara-
tive dimensions of constitutional studies. Although essential, this 
supplementation strategy only takes us part of the way. What it 
entails, in effect, is the posting of additional sentries at the fron-
6. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LiBERALISM 40 (1993). 
7. JOHN RAWLS. A THEORY OF JUSTICE 8 (1971). 
8. See JoH:-; RAWLS. THE LAW OF PEOPLES (1999). in which Rawls turns his atten-
tion to relationships among political communities. 
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tier between the domestic and the foreign, with the new enlistees 
aiming outward rather than inward. 
The problem with this image is that it presumes the exist-
ence of a firm divide between national-self and outside-other, 
between the domestic and the foreign, that doesn't hold up. 
Certainly, some issues fall neatly on one side of the line or the 
other, thus justifying a division of labor between inward and 
outward-looking constitutionalism. But it is also true that the 
national self and its others converge in a multiplicity of moments 
and manners and locations, and these convergences complicate 
the presumed divide between the in-here and the out-there. The 
domestic and the foreign often run up against each other. Whether 
formally or informally, violently or uneventfully, they interact; 
they mutually engage. 
Notably, those occasions and locations of interaction be-
tween the domestic and the foreign are themselves neither en-
tirely domestic nor entirely foreign; they are interstitial spaces, 
characterized by what anthropologists call liminality.9 Whether 
arising at the nation's geographic frontiers or its figurative ones, 
they require their own attention as an analytical matter. 
And, indeed, attention is now being paid in many disciplines, 
via the subfield of "border studies." 10 The consistent analytical 
premise of border studies is that the boundaries between the 
domestic and the foreign themselves constitute a sphere or set of 
spheres with their own distinct set of dynamics, their own ecolo-
gies, which require their own scholarly focus. 
Purely for empirical reasons, then, making sense of the con-
temporary legal and political and social landscape requires at-
tending not just to the national inside and the national outside, 
but to those domains of interaction at the border between them. 
Yet once again the significance of attending to these liminal 
spaces and moments is more than additive. The border between 
the domestic and the foreign is not merely a "third space" which 
demands attention in its own right 11 -although it does. A focus 
on national boundaries makes clear, additionally, that there are 
really no unalloyed domestic and foreign spaces after all. The 
nation's inside and its outside are always interpenetrated, always 
9. See generally VICTOR TURNER, BetwiXI and Between: The Liminal Period in 
Rites de Passage, in THE FOREST OF SYMBOLS: ASPECTS OF NDEMBU RITUAL (1967). 
10. Partly because it is interdisciplinary. the literature is vast. For one synthetic. 
introductory treatment with a focus on the social sciences, see Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly. 
Theorizing Borders: An Interdisciplinary Perspective. 10(4) GEOPOLITICS, 633-49 (2005). 
II. See generally HOM! BHABBHA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994). 
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marbled through with one another. Border studies anatomize 
these domains of interface; and in the process, allow us to see 
how the domestic and the foreign are constantly making and re-
making one another. 
One implication is that attending to the nation's edges, 
wherever those are located, is of essential importance even for 
those whose primary interest remains inward-looking, domestic 
constitutionallaw. 12 For it turns out that the constitutional inside 
is comprised not merely by matters of "ruling and being ruled" 
and other issues conventionally understood to lie at the heart of 
the field, 13 but by all of the rules and practices that govern the 
scope -personal and territorial-of the community within which 
people are ruling and being ruled. Policies and practices regard-
ing immigration and citizenship status, extraterritorial jurisdic-
tion, military occupation, management of territorial possessions, 
assignment of enemy combatant status in war, rights of noncitizens, 
status of refugees and escapees-all of these infuse and give 
shape to the presumptive "who" and "where" which serve as 
backdrop to many of the questions that are conventionally con-
sidered to lie at the core of constitutional inquiry. 
This excellent volume of essays directs its gaze precisely at 
the domains of interaction between the foreign and the domestic 
in the context of the American nation-state. Originally published 
as a special issue of the American Quarterly, it is a collection of 
articles by scholars in law, literature and history who are devoted 
to making sense of the United States by way of its legally con-
structed edges. Sometimes these edges are located at the nation's 
geographic frontier, but just as often they can be found on the 
other side of the world or in very heart of the nation's territory. 
And it is often in, and through, the bodies and minds of persons-
whether they happen to be territorially inside or not- that these 
edges are most consequential. As the collection's editors Mary 
Dudziak and Leti Volpp write in their introduction, the volume's 
essays address not only "spaces on the edge of American sover-
eignty," but also "internal places at the heart of American iden-
tity" (p. 2). These are the legal "borderlands" of the volume's title. 
Dudziak, a legal historian, and Volpp, a culturally-minded 
legal scholar, have drawn together a set of essays that produc-
12. See PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: 
CASES AND MATERIALSch. 4, §II (5th ed. 2006}. 
13. Cf T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Swdies in Constitutional Law: A 
Comment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2000). 
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tively transverse traditional disciplinary boundaries. The literary 
and historical chapters are legally grounded, while the legal 
chapters are richly historical and culturally-informed. Reading 
them reminds us how and why interdisciplinarity can be so re-
warding. The interdisciplinarity works well here because, for the 
most part, the diverse approaches are linked by common sub-
stantive questions about America's national edges, as refracted 
through issues of identity, responsibility, power and membership. 
Thus, there are essays on wartime internment, on immigration 
and naturalization policy, on military occupation, on extra-
territorial jurisdiction, on sovereignty, on statelessness and on 
nativism. 
Not surprisingly given the essays' range, the framing idea of 
"borderland" here can sometimes seem overworked. In an early 
chapter in the volume, Austin Sarat writes of the "uncertain 
boundaries of the rule of law itself" (p. 34 ). Here, the idea of 
borderlands is used purely metaphorically, to reference ques-
tions about the scope of law and legal concepts. 14 Elsewhere in 
the volume, the idea of "border" is employed to refer to generic 
issues of "internal" inclusion and exclusion, via the concepts of 
"sexual borderlands" and "racial borderlands." These uses of the 
term, while perhaps valuable in other contexts, distract in the con-
text of this particular volume. The intellectual significance of this 
collection of essays, it seems to me, lies in its focus on national 
borders and on the borders of the American nation state, in par-
ticular. These are borders that constitute America not merely as 
a society but as a national polity located in the wider world. When 
the terms "borders" and "borderlands" are used without specific 
reference to national bordering, they can appear jargonish, and 
their use serves to undercut the analytical contribution the volume 
otherwise makes. 
That is not to say that the study of "internal" forms of status 
exclusion, like racism, are beyond the proper scope of this volume. 
On the contrary, race has to figure centrally in any study of the 
construction of the nation. And this volume contributes signifi-
cantly to analyzing the tangled linkages between nation and race. 
Some of the most powerful chapters in the book specifically con-
join a study of classically internal forms of status exclusions, like 
those associated with race, with construction of national borders 
14. Austin Sarat. At the Boundaries of Law: Exewtive Clemency, Sovereign Preroga-
tive, and the Dilemma of American Legality (pp. 19-39). Sarat writes: ''[T]he rule of law is 
replete with gaps. fissures and failures. places where law runs up against national interest of 
sovereign prerogative. Its boundaries are unclear. uncertain. unchartable" (p. 34). 
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and the national domestic/foreign divide. For example, in a 
chapter entitled "Racial Naturalization," legal scholar Devon 
Carbado powerfully characterizes his experience of induction into 
American national membership as a young black immigrant. In a 
pair of encounters with the LA police department-one while 
driving, the other in an erroneous apartment search- he and his 
brothers sought to invoke their "foreignness" to exempt them-
selves from assigned inclusion in the category of American black 
criminality, but to little avail. Although the police officers involved 
found themselves confused by the British accents and the lack of 
submissive "racial etiquette," they ultimately imbued the young 
men with black American identity through imposition of demean-
ing racialized law enforcement rituals. In this respect the brothers 
were "naturalized," not in the "formal and doctrinal" sense 
(p. 45), but in a metaphoric sense: "our race had naturalized us" 
into American national identity (p. 44 ). Their inclusion in the 
nation precisely entailed, and was marked by, racial subordina-
tion.15 
In reflecting upon these experiences, Carbado proposes a 
way of thinking about the relationship between equality and be-
longing, between "the color line" and the territorial border-line, 
that is analytically useful. The matrices of equality/inequality 
and inclusion/inclusion are related paradoxically, he argues: "To 
racially belong to America as a nonwhite is to experience racial 
inequality"- that is, to experience exclusion (p. 47). In this re-
gard, racism not only divides us as Americans; it also binds us as a 
nation in a multiracial hierarchy, via a longstanding regime of "in-
clusive exclusion" (p. 60). Here, the theoretical linkage explored 
between "internal border" and national border advances our 
study of the modalities of American otherness. 
If, moreover, some of the metaphorical uses of the border 
concept threaten to thin it out too much, an insistence on a nar-
rower, literal usage is no antidote. The volume's contribution 
derives precisely from its spacious interpretation of the national 
15. This is an argument made by Toni Morrison in a well-known essay some years 
ago. Morrison wrote that the "most enduring and efficient rite of passage into American 
culture [is] negative appraisals of the native-born black population. Only when the lesson 
of racial estrangement is learned is assimilation complete." Toni Morrison, On the Backs 
uf Blacks, in ARGUING IMMIGRATION: THE DEBATE OVER THE CHANGING FACE OF 
AMERICA 97 (Nicolaus Mills ed .. Touchstone 1994). In response, Carbado writes, "Mor-
rison's analysis might lead one to conclude that the episode she describes figures [the 
Greek immigrants'] but not the shoe shiner's Americanization. My own view, however, is 
that the encounter naturalizes the shoe shiner as well. More than merely reflect the shoe 
shiner's black American identity, the encounter actually produces it." (p. 60). 
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border concept. As a group, these essays make clear that national 
borders are not merely physical frontiers at the edges of nation-
state territory. Borders are legal regimes within states that work 
to police membership, and they are sites of power claimed by 
states that operate in physical spaces far afield from the nation's 
geographic "home." Borders defend but they also contain; they 
divide but they also join. National borders have both instrumental 
and expressive content. The collection as a whole captures all of 
these facets, making its broad usage of the "border" concept 
valuable overall. 
A number of these essays are especially relevant to Ameri-
can constitutional thought today. Christina Burnett's chapter, 
The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American 
Guano Islands (pp. 187-211), serves as an instructive counter-
point to the fast-growing literature on the constitutional status of 
unincorporated territories. 16 Unlike Puerto Rico, a territory cast 
in the Insular Cases as "foreign in a domestic sense," Palmyra 
(one of the Guano Islands) "is the only 'incorporated' territory 
of the United States." (p. 187). In the course of recounting how a 
series of tiny islets in the South Pacific (graced with a copious re-
serve of dried bird droppings considered valuable as fertilizer), 
came to possess such a unique and comparatively privileged 
status, Burnett provides a rich legal history of American extra-
territorial expansion in the 19th century. In the course of the 
analysis, she highlights the key legal distinction between territor-
ies deemed to belong to, without being a part of, the United States 
(e.g., Puerto Rico) and those which are indeed considered a part 
of the United States such that the Constitution "follows the flag" 
there. As the Guano Islands highlight, the distinction is difficult 
to justify in formal and practical terms, yet it is highly con-
sequential. For if Palmyra had any inhabitants to speak of, they 
would be entitled to full constitutional protections against 
American power, as the millions of residents of Puerto Rico-
deemed "foreign ... in a domestic sense" 17 - are not. 18 
16. This is a literature Burnett herself has importantly helped to nurture and to which 
she has contributed. See FOREIGN IN A DOMESTIC SENSE: PUERTO RICO, AMERICAr-< 
EXPANSION. AND THE CONSTITUTION (Christina Burnett and Burke Marshall, eds. 2001). 
17. Downes v. Bidwell, 1112 U.S. 244,341-42 (1901) (White, J., concurring). Christina 
Burnett co-edited an important collection of essays on the constitutional status of Puerto 
Rico in 2001. See Burnett & Marshall, supra note lli. 
18. Per the Insular cases. ··nonfundamental" constitutional rights and limitations do 
not apply in Puerto Rico or other incorporated territories. but truly "fundamental" rights 
and limitations (whatever these are. exactly) do. For discussion, see Gerald L. Neuman. 
Constitutionalism and Individual Rights in the Territories. in Burnett & Marshall. supra 
note lli, at 1112-2011. 
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But of course, if Palmyra is not Puerto Rico, neither is it a 
state of the union; it is some kind of intermediate, hybrid creature. 
Burnett reads this hybridity, and its relation to the distinct hybridity 
of the unincorporated territories, by reference to sovereignty and 
its manipulations. She makes clear that the history of American 
imperialism is as much about the disclaiming as the assertion of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty carries burdens as well as benefits, she 
writes; and "[t]he practice of imperialism ... has relied on the 
creation of legal categories that do their work by withholding, 
retracting, and assiduously delimiting national power, as well as 
by increasing and extending it" (p. 208) precisely in order to avoid 
obligations conventionally regarded as appurtenant to rule. 
Efforts by the United State to assert control while disclaiming 
sovereignty, of course, have notoriously framed recent debates 
over the nation's detention facilities in Guantanamo Bay. Amy 
Kaplan's essay, entitled Where Is Guantanamo? (pp. 239-66), 
examines the ways in which the United States has sought to con-
struct and exploit the disjuncture between control and responsi-
bility in Guantanamo Bay. Guantanamo is a hybrid in its own 
distinct way- "an animal" with "no other like it" -in Justice 
Ginsburg's words 19 -where coercive state power is deployed not 
merely beyond the formal territory of the state but "outside the 
rule of law" itself (p. 240). The Supreme Court in Rasul did re-
pudiate government efforts to maintain Guantanamo as a space 
outside "the rule of domestic law" (p. 241 ). Yet the prison persists 
as a "legal black hole" (p. 239). And the best the Rasul majority 
could muster in any event was the argument that Guantanamo 
should be read in light of the Insular Cases, thus placing it "in an 
indefinite legal borderland between the domestic and the foreign" 
(p. 255)- hardly a mortal blow, she points out, against empire. 
Much of this chapter narrates what Kaplan calls the "long 
imperial history" of the U.S. in Guantanamo (pp. 242-45). At 
one time, Guantanamo served a way-station in the African slave 
trade, and in the trade of sugar and molasses produced by slave 
labor. The U.S. gained control in 1903 in the wake of the Spanish 
American War pursuant to a lease agreement signed with 
Cuba-one which effectively forced Cuba "to cede sovereignty 
over part of the territory it never controlled" (p. 244). There-
after, Guantanamo served as a "coaling station, a naval base, a 
19. Quoted at (p. 239). At oral argument in the Ra1·u/ case, Justice Ginsburg stated, "I think 
Guantanamo. everyone agrees, is an animal. there is no other like it." Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg. 
Oral Arguments. Rasu/ v. Bu.1h, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). Transcript of Oral Argument are available at 
httpJ/www .supremecourtus.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/03-334.pdf. 
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cold war outpost and a detention center for unwanted refugees" 
(p. 240) before it became a notorious prison camp. Meanwhile, 
since the mid-20th century, the residential portions of the base have 
been portrayed as a kind of transplanted small-town America, and 
even today, with its "bowling alleys, video rental shops, golf courses 
and McDonald's restaurants" (p. 246), it is still described by 
military personnel as "Mayberry RFD with bad neighbors"(p. 
246)20 (although, as Kaplan notes, it is unclear whether the bad 
neighbors referred to are "the Cubans kept out by barbed wire 
fences and military guards or the prisoners encaged by barbed 
wire inside the base" (p. 246).) 
Kaplan's point in providing this context is to situate the de-
bates over Guantanamo in a larger social and political field than 
the usual legal accounts provide. Kaplan makes two arguments: 
First, Guantanamo needs to be read as part of a larger history of 
American imperialism. Most legal discussions of the prison camp 
there focus on matters of human rights, national security, extra-
territorial jurisdiction and the scope of international law. While 
these elements are obviously crucial, "the legal space of Guanta-
namo today has been shaped and remains haunted by its imRerial 
history" (p. 241) and needs to be understood in these terms. 1 Her 
account-which includes detailed and perceptive readings of the 
Rasul and Hamdan decisions-impels us to reflect on how it has 
come to pass that this tiny slice of island, so close and yet so far 
from the United States, "occupies a transitional political space, 
where a prison housed in a communist nation against whom the 
U.S. is still fighting the cold war has become an epi-center for the 
new 'war on terror'" (pp. 239-40), and also about how it has come 
to serve as both prototype and shorthand for other instances of 
20. For this quote, Kaplan cites Matthew Hay Brown, Cuban Base Has American 
Flavor. MORNING CALL ONLINE. Jan. 2. 2004 (p. 264 n.30). Kaplan continues: "With un-
intended irony. a defense department publication elaborated on the meaning of "May-
berry," the town in television's Andy Griffith Show of the 1960's. 'Like Mayberry, 
Guantanamo Bay has virtually no crime"' (p. 246-47), citing Kathleen T. Rhem. From 
Mayberry to Metropolis: Guantdnamo Bay Changes. AMERICAN FORCES PRESS 
SERVICE. Mar. 3. 2005. 
21. Kaplan writes: "Until recently. the notion of American imperialism was consid-
ered a contradiction in terms. an accusation hurled only by left-wing critics. Indeed the 
denial of imperialism still fuels a vision of America as an exceptional nation, one inter-
ested in spreading universal values, not in conquest and domination. Yet, since September 
11. 2001. neoconservative and liberal interventionists have openly embraced the vision of 
an ascendant American Empire policing and transforming the world around it through 
military and political might and economic and cultural power. Other commentators of 
different political perspectives have viewed the United States as an overstretched empire 
in chaotic decline ... (However, t]he question of empire has rarely entered the important 
legal debates about ... Guantanamo as a legal dilemma" (pp. 240-41). 
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unbridled incarcerative power (by way of what Michelle Brown, 
another of the volume's contributors, calls "The Prison Nation 
Abroad" (p. 381)). 
Second, Kaplan powerfully reminds us that the naval base at 
Guantanamo has served a range of imperial functions over the 
years: "[F]rom a way-station for the global reach of military 
might outward, it became a site of detention camps for blocking 
Haitian and Cuban refugees from entering the United States." 
(p. 247). One portion of the camp was newly constructed in the 
1980's to house HIV -infected Haitians during a period of race-
inflected hysteria over mass contagion. These anxieties extend to 
the current prisoners who "continue to inhabit the racialized 
images ... of shackled slaves, infected bodies, revolutionary sub-
jects, and undesirable immigrants" (p. 248). 
Overall, this chapter brings legal studies together with 
American Studies in a particularly effective way. Its sometimes-
devastating cultural reading of "Guantanamo as a legal dilemma" 
(p. 241) represents interdisciplinarity at its best. 
Another fascinating chapter of constitutional interest turns 
its sights back to the national interior and explores the complex 
interface between race and immigration politics here, this time in 
an historical context. Moon-Ho Jung's chapter, "Outlawing 
'Coolies': Race, Nation and Empire in the Age of Emancipa-
tion" (pp. 85-109), examines the interplay between anti-slavery 
and racist logics in the debate over Chinese contract laborers who 
entered the United States en masse in the post-Civil War era. 
Jung shows, first, how the Chinese contract labor system exploded 
after emancipation in response to escalating labor demands and, 
in turn, how opposition to the "coolie" labor system served to 
justify opposition to Chinese immigration more broadly, and 
eventually made possible "the passage of the nation's first re-
strictions on immigration under the banner of 'freedom'" (p. 87). 
Anti-slavery arguments, in short, subserved anti-Chinese policy. 
In the process, the chapter shows how demarcating "the legal 
boundary between slavery and freedom" (p. 86), between migrant 
labor importation and immigration, is difficult (a point we have 
yet again seen underlined by recent debates in the U.S. over 
proposed guest-worker programs). Jung asks, "[ d]id the recruit-
ment and employment of 'coolies' represent a relic of slavery or 
a harbinger of freedom?" (p. 88). That question was answered 
differently by different parties at different moments; the "coolie" 
labor regime was, at times, regarded (both by pro-slavery and 
abolitionist forces) as tantamount to, or even more exploitative 
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than, slavery; at others, as a means of effectuating slave emancipa-
tion and as an exemplar of "free" labor. But whatever the verdict, 
Jung shows how the Chinese coolies and African slaves or former 
slaves-'"the Chinaman and the Negro"' (p. 91)-were each 
employed to construct the other as racial inferiors and, simul-
taneously, to produce an image of the "immigrant" to America 
as a white European. 
Meanwhile, the story of the coolie trade and the opposition 
it engendered is part of the story of nineteenth century United 
States imperial expansion in the Caribbean and Asia. After 
British emancipation, Chinese labor became essential as replace-
ment labor on Caribbean plantations. In response, the anti-
bellum U.S. government deployed anti-slavery and free trade 
rhetoric as justification for more aggressive regional interven-
tions aimed at "deliverance of slaves and 'coolies' from back-
ward despots" (p. 101). This history is recounted by Jung in chewy 
detail. Overall, the chapter's portrait of Chinese Exclusion as a 
site where slavery and emancipation, labor relations, racial strat-
ification, immigration policy and national expansionism all inter-
sect highlights the power and the the necessity of engaging in 
scholarly inquiry at the border. 
There are several other chapters in the Borderlands volume 
which will be of interest to many constitutional scholars. These 
include Teemu Ruskola's essay on the 19th century regime of 
American extraterritorial jurisdiction in Canton (an instance of 
what Ruskola calls "nonterritorial imperialism" (p. 267-92, 283)), 
Lisa Yoneyama's essay on Japanese women's enfranchisement 
under American military occupation after World War II (pp. 293-
318), Susan L. Carruther's treatment of Eastern Bloc "escapees" 
during the Cold War (pp. 319-50), Linda Kerber's account of the 
development of the institution of statelessness in the U.S. (pp. 
135-57), and Michelle Brown's chapter on Abu Ghraib and the 
"Prison Nation Abroad." All of these present perceptive treat-
ments of the borders, physical and symbolic, that divide the 
domestic from the foreign (pp. 381-405).22 
22. Other chapters include an entertaining piece on Oil, Empire and the Sport Util-
ity Vehicle. sec David Campbell. The Biopolitics of Sewrtiy: Oil, Empire and the Sports 
Utility Vehicle (pp. 351-110). and the following chapters: Siobhan B. Somerville. Notes 
Toward a Queer Hiswry of Naturalization (pp. 67-113); Nayan Shah, Between "Oriefllal 
Depravity" and "Natural Degenerates": Spatial Borderlands and the Making of Ordinary 
Americans (pp. 111-33); Maria Josefina Saldana-Portillo. In the Shadow of NAFTA: Y 
Tu Mama Tamhien Revisits the National Allegory of Mexican Sovereigflly (pp. 159-115); 
Andrew Hebard. Romamic Sovereignty: Popular Romances and the American Imperial 
Swte in the Phillippines (pp. 213-311). and an introductory essay. Austin Sara!, At the 
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In sum, this volume of interdisciplinary essays on the legal 
construction of national borders has much to offer constitutional 
scholars. Yet it is worth considering the question of how, exactly, 
it can be useful. We clearly all benefit from reading across fields 
and reading interdisciplinarily, but what is this material's rele-
vance to the field of constitutional studies specifically? Does 
constitutional law simply regard the border literature produced 
in other areas of law and in neighboring disciplines as pools 
which are edifying to dip into from time to time, but which are 
ultimately tangential to its standard research program? Or must 
national edges be brought into the center of the field itself? 
Aleinikoff has argued that constitutional law scholarship needs 
to widen its gaze to address questions of the American nation-
state's "borders, its members and its powers. "23 I entirely agree, 
as I have made clear. So far, these issues have remained largely 
off the main stage-as preconditional but unremarked frame-
works rather than the central event. That is not to say the issues are 
unexplored: there is, in fact, a great deal of powerful work going on 
in constitutional studies on "legal spatiality,"24 territoriality, asser-
tions and denials of sovereignty, scope of jurisdiction, citizenship 
and immigration. Recent events associated with the "war on 
terror" have clearly accelerated the pace of production on these 
themes.25 Still, in many respects, studies of the divide between 
America's foreign and domestic spheres continue to languish in 
"the backwaters of constitutional law. "26 
To make America's edges a central preoccupation of Amer-
ican constitutional law would be to self-consciously develop a 
Boundaries of Law: Executive Clemency. Sovereign Prerogative, and the Dilemma of 
American Legality (pp. 19-39). 
23. ALEINIKOFF. supra note 5, at 11. 
24. Kal Raustiala, The Geography of.l!wice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2501 (2005) 
25. E.g, David Cole, ENEMY ALIENS (New Press, 2003); Neal Katyal, Equality in the 
War on Terror. 59 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (2007); Natsu Taylor Saito, FROM CHINESE EXCLUSION 
TOGUANTANAMO BAY: PLENARY POWER AND THE PREROGATIVESTATE(2<XJ7). 
26. ALEINIKOFF. supra note 5, at 1H3. Other scholars have urged that questions 
concerning the scope of the nation's membership and territory be treated as central to 
the field. See especially the symposium issue of Constitutional Commentary on The Can· 
ons of Constitutional Law, esp. Sanford Levinson. Why The Canon Should Be Expanded 
To Include the Insular Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism. 17 CONST. 
COMMENT. 241 (2000); Mark Tushnet. The Canons of Constitutional Law. An lntroduc· 
cion, 17 CONST. CoMMENT. 1H7 (2000). See also Aleinikoff's contribution to the same 
symposium issue. T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Sovereignty Studies in Constitutional Law: A 
Comment, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 197 (2000). Several years earlier. Gerald Neuman urged 
constitutional scholars to attend to themes of national membership and the scope of na-
tional territory and jursidiction. See GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE 
CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW (1996). 
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subfield of national boundary studies. Aleinikoff proposes "sov-
ereignty studies" to name the field (or a similar one), but I don't 
find that framing compelling. Sovereignty, it seems to me, is one 
among many of the substantive themes this field must investigate, 
along with membership, territoriality, spatiality, citizenship, and 
jurisdiction, rather than an umbrella concept that contains them 
all. Indeed the idea of sovereignty seems to reference only part 
of what is at stake here: the term is conventionally linked with 
governance and power (and perhaps, by implication, its absence), 
but not with structural and experiential issues of national mem-
bership, solidarity, identity, and lack thereof.27 Further, the term 
"sovereignty" seems to me to be loaded with too many assump-
tions about the nature of political community for the job.28 Sov-
ereignty's nearly inextricable association with the nation-state-
the fact that we tend to treat the nation-state as the natural and 
inevitable locus of sovereignty- makes it hard to treat the national 
state as a central object of analysis in such a field. The idea of 
"sovereignty studies," in other words, seems to presuppose a 
substantial part of what we want to investigate.29 
We are better off with a concept that names not a substantive 
quantity but a domain of inquiry. Arguably, the idea of "bound-
aries" does this. To speak of boundaries is not necessarily to 
speak of a physical domain; boundaries are often inanimate. On 
the other hand, the object of inquiry would not be conceptual 
boundaries, or the "the boundaries of legality" generally (p. 34) 
since, after all, much of legal studies could be described as the 
investigation of where and when some rules or standards give 
out and others begin. The focus, instead, would be the territorial 
27. For a thoughtful recent reflection on the concept of sovereignty. See James 
Sheehan. Presidential Address: The Prvhlem of Sovereignty in European History. 111 
AM. HIST. REV. 1. 2 (2006): 
Sovereignty is obviously a political concept. but unlike political concepts such as 
democracy or monarchy. it is not about the location of power (the sovereign. 
Hobbes wrote. can be ''the one or the many"): unlike parliament or bureauc-
racy. it does not describe institutions that exercise power: and unlike order or 
justice. it does not define the purposes of power. The concept of sovereignty has 
to do with the relationship of political power to other forms of authority. 
Sovereignty is best understood as a set of claims made by those seeking or 
wielding power. claims about the superiority and autonomy of their authority. 
28. For a useful commentary on the nationalist presumptions of the sovereignty 
concept. see R.B.J. Walker. Sovereignty. Identity. Community: Reflections on the Horizons 
of Contemporary Politir.:al Practir.:e, in CmHENDING SOVEREIGNTIES: REDEFINI:--JG 
POLITICAL COMMUNITY 159--85 (R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz. eds .. Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 1990). 
29. Given Aleinikoff's own preoccupations with "sovereignty and membership.'' 
"sovereignty studies" does not quite seem to capture what he is after in any event. 
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and jurisdictional boundaries of the American nation, as mediated 
through constitutional law. Studying national boundaries means 
studying the ongoing construction and reconstruction of the con-
text within which the Constitution is deemed, or claimed to be, 
operative. It means attending to the endlessly contested geo-
graphic and personal domain of all those rights and powers that 
are conventionally considered the real subject of constitutional 
law. It means making the frame part of the story. 
To argue that the nation's boundaries ought to be made a 
central object of constitutional focus, I should add, is not neces-
sarily to express a normative view about those boundaries. It is 
true that in many fields, border studies tend to be critical in 
orientation; and virtually all of the Borderlands chapters draw 
on, and articulate, critical approaches in their various disciplines. 
Yet my point here in urging more attention to the nation's edges 
is predominantly methodological in nature: the problem is not so 
much that national boundaries and their enforcement are bad as 
that they are ignored. 
On the other hand, the methodological probably cannot ul-
timately be severed from the normative in this endeavor. After 
all, questions will more often be ignored when they relate to 
phenomena taken to be natural and unproblematic; and con-
versely, the very process of disregard tends to reinforce the per-
ception of their naturalness and unproblematic quality. In this 
regard, simply placing these questions on the table can be viewed 
as a critical act, an act of "denaturalizing" aspects of the world 
heretofore taken-for-granted. 
It is also true that questions about national boundaries in-
evitably implicate themes of exclusion and domination, about 
which some normative engagement is inevitable. And since ex-
clusion and domination within the nation are themes that lie at 
the heart of the constitutional law field, making national bound-
aries a central concern of the field will require us to think about 
how well, and to what extent, the field's standard normative 
frameworks translate from the nation's center to its edges. 
In sum, for those constitutional law scholars interested in 
making American edges more central to the field, the essays in 
the Borderlands volume provide an excellent accompaniment. 
Through imaginative readings of historical and contemporary le-
gal materials, they help us to think about who is in and who is 
out, where is here and where is there-in short, about what is 
domestic and what is foreign in a national sense. 
